Abstract -
The most numerous types of limitations, revenue and tax rate limits, explicitly constrain local government behavior. The third type, limitations on increases in the taxable value of property, is less common and does not explicitly constrain local government behavior. What these limits have in common is their direct constraint of individual property tax payments. Previous research on the motivations for property tax limitations has focused on constraint of government behavior, electing not to focus on the common effect of these limitations on individual property tax payments. Vigdor (2004) provides a detailed review of the most prominent explanations for the existence of statewide limitations on local governments.
1 As Vigdor notes, in the Tiebout (1956) model voters in an individual jurisdiction would never submit to limitations on their local government revenues and rates so long as residents have the power to dictate revenue and rate policy according to their preferences. The lack of motivation for limits when residents have control over policy suggests that perhaps residents have limited control over policy. This idea that residents have limited control over local policies on revenues and tax rates is often called the "Leviathan" model of local government. In the context of the Leviathan model, local governments raise local property tax revenues that are excessive and ineffi cient.
The "state regime shift" theory does not require leviathan governments. Instead, the state regime shift theory focuses on voters' desire to have the state fi nance a larger portion of necessary revenues with income and sales taxes, thus reducing reliance on local property taxes (see Fischel (1989) and Nechyba (1997) ). Vigdor (2004) proposes an alternative to these theories, noting that limitations on local government allow voters to infl uence local tax and expenditure decisions in jurisdictions where they do not reside. This motivation exists even when the median voter controls policy within each jurisdiction. The median voter 's control of local policy requires that these limitations be passed by the state legislature. Non-residents wish to limit local government behavior in order to make other communities more attractive to them in their roles as absentee landlords, wage earners, and possibly future residents. Vigdor's non-resident theory, like the state regime shift theory, does not require that voters have limited control over their own local government fi scal policies.
Vigdor's non-resident theory considers a motivation for limits that exists without Leviathan governments. Vigdor's theory, however, still relies on a government that needs to be restrained, in this case by non-residents, and this desire for restraint of local government is the motivation behind the property tax limitation.
Some form of property tax limitation might still be desirable even in the absence of any motivation to constraint excessive or ineffi cient government expenditures. In order to understand this possibility it is necessary to discuss how each of the three primary limits affects individual property tax payments. In particular, it is important to show how individual tax payments change for reasons other than revenue changes. That is, individual tax payments can change even when a district's revenue requirements are constant, and this turns out to be key in understanding why some form of property tax limitation might exist without excessive or ineffi cient government expenditures.
Consider the example of an individual homeowner (i) owning property with a taxable value of v i in a jurisdiction (j) with a property tax rate of τ j . Her property tax liability to jurisdiction j at time t is:
It is important to note that, dropping the time subscripts, the tax rate is defi ned as the ratio of the desired property tax revenue, R j , to the total amount of taxable value in the jurisdiction, V j ,
Denoting the total taxable value of all residential (homeowner) property in jurisdiction j as H j , the average taxable value of residential property as H -j , and property tax revenue per homeowner as R -j , it can be shown that an individual homeowner's property tax liability is:
A resident homeowner's property liability at any point in time is a function of the per-capita revenue, the ratio of the value of their home to the average home value, and the share of the tax base that is owned by homeowners. This equation supports the claim above: that tax payments might change even though revenue is constant, since individual property tax payments will change over time when an individual's share of taxable values changes.
Here is an example of changing individual tax payments in the face of constant revenue. Suppose there is a jurisdiction with only two homes, each valued at $200. If the local government requires $50 of revenue, each taxpayer will pay $25 under a pure current value assessment system. Next year, the government again needs $50, but one of the homes has gone up in value to $400 (the other is still valued at $200). Under this scenario, with government revenue still at $50, the fi rst taxpayer will pay about $33, while the other will pay about $17. With no increase in government revenue, each taxpayer has experienced a 32 percent change in their tax payment. The increase in tax payments faced by the appreciating home would be higher still if government revenue had not remained constant.
These constant-revenue increases in tax payments are another reason why property owners may support tax limitations. If property owners prefer smooth property tax payments across years to volatile and possibly unanticipated increases in payments, they may support tax limitation measures without any desire to constrain local government tax and expenditure policy.
Tax limits constrain increases in individual property tax payments over time. Limits on property tax revenue and property tax rates are the most widespread property tax limitations, with 34 states having some form of rate limits and 29 having some form of revenue limits. Limits on increases in assessed (i.e., taxable) value are also numerous, with 20 states having some form of assessment limits in place as of 2006. See Table 1 Source: Author's tabulations. The column "Statewide assessment limits" indicates that the state requires that some form of assessment limitation be in place across the entire state. Some form of assessment limit also includes states that allow a local option to limit assessments or require only that certain locations limit assessments. The column indicating tax rate limits does not differentiate between general and specifi c rate limits. The annual assessments column indicates states that require that each taxing district use annually updated taxable values. States that allow a local option to assess annually or only require certain places to assess annually receive a "No" in the column. Please contact the author with questions and corrections.
York mandates limits in New York City and Nassau County. 4 Iowa and Colorado limit increases in the total taxable value of residential property in the entire state. Tax Rate Limits are in effect in 34 states, with 23 of these 34 states also having revenue limits and 16 also having some form of assessment limits. Rate limits are either specifi c or general. Specifi c limits constrain the property tax rates of particular funds within taxing districts, while general limits constrain the total property tax rate within taxing jurisdictions. In Illinois, as in most other states, each taxing district has many different tax rates. For example, school districts located in cities with less than 500,000 inhabitants have fi ve revenue categories, with a specifi c tax rate assigned to a total of 36 expenditure categories within these revenue categories. Illinois has specifi c tax rate limitations that vary from fund to fund. California has a general limit that constrains the maximum tax rate to be less than or equal to one percent of taxable value.
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Rate limits constrain individual property tax payments by setting a maximum value for the ratio of revenue to total tax base. If increases in total tax base and individual tax base are relatively small and relatively infrequent, tax rate limits will effectively constrain increases in individual property tax payments.
Five states have limitation on tax rates without any explicit statewide limits on either revenues or assessment increases. Of these fi ve states, Alabama, North Carolina, and New York do not require annual updates to individual taxable values.
8
Wyoming also limits tax rates without other limits and appears to require annual updates to taxable values. Thus, three of the five states with only rate limits appear to feature property tax systems that encourage infrequent changes in the taxable values of individual properties.
TAX LIMITATIONS AS INSURANCE
Previous research on the motivations for property tax limitations implicitly assumes that voters face no risk: policies have known costs and future tax burdens are known amounts. Moreover, it is often 4 Georgia gives counties the option of freezing property values for tax purposes. Nineteen counties have chosen to freeze residential values. In 2004, Illinois provided counties the temporary right to cap assessment increases at seven percent. So far only one county (Cook County) has elected to do so. Connecticut allows a town's voters to approve limitations on individual assessment increases. 5 Massachusetts allows a local split rate option, which, when instituted, can implicitly restrict increases in the total taxable value of residential property, but not individual values. 6 Assessment limits that apply only to residential properties do not limit increases in the tax payments of individuals owning non-residential properties. Note also that states with non-annual assessment systems essentially cap annual assessment increases at zero in non-assessment years. 7 In most states with tax rate limitations (although not in California), the limitations can be overridden through a referendum. Often it is the case that some funds within taxing districts are not subject to limitations (i.e., revenues used to fi nance debt obligations).
8 AL, NC, and UT all have property classifi cation systems as well. For example, in Utah 55 percent of residential property market value is taxable compared to 100 percent of commercial property market value. New York has classifi cation and assessment limits only in New York City and Nassau County. New York offers fi nancial incentives for local governments to assess more frequently. Utah also has a strong full disclosure law.
assumed that voters are not concerned with risk and, thus, would not pay for insurance anyway. In the presence of somewhat unpredictable volatility in tax liability, risk-averse voters may want to take out insurance in the form of limits, even if they trust the government to serve their needs. Risk comes in two forms: policies can have risky costs (which affect all voters' tax burdens) and voters can have risky shares of the total tax base. Individual shares of taxable value will be volatile and risky when both true changes in home value and assessment error are sometimes unexpected and unevenly distributed across properties within a jurisdiction.
Consider again the example with two homeowners who must fi nance $50 of government revenue. If assessment increases were capped at 50 percent, the taxable value of the highly appreciating house would be $300 instead of $400, while the taxable value of the non-appreciating house still remains at $200. The owner of the higher-valued house would now pay $30 instead of the $33 she would have paid without the cap, but $5 more than the $25 she paid in the previous year. The owner of the lower-valued home would now pay $20, $3 more than he would have paid without the cap, but still $5 less than he paid the previous year.
This explains how assessment limits might work as insurance. An assessment cap can be thought of as insurance against large property tax increases. The cost of the insurance is the foregone tax break experienced by homes that do not appreciate enough to be restricted by the cap. The benefi t of the insurance is the avoidance of the risk of an unexpectedly higher property tax bill in the future. If the owner of the $200 home is willing to pay $3 this year for the guarantee that his tax bill will not increase by more than $5 next year (assuming a constant levy), then the benefi t of the insurance exceeds its costs. The property owner who benefi ted this year realizes that she will be forced to pay the premium (in foregone tax savings) if her property appreciates relatively less in the future compared to other properties.
Just as individuals are willing to pay for health insurance, individuals may also be willing to pay for insurance against unexpected tax increases. Just as a person might not lament the health insurance payment that comes with no direct current benefi t (i.e., the person is currently healthy), a person may also not lament the tax increase (i.e., forgone tax reduction) that comes with no current benefi t (i.e., the property appreciated by an amount less than the cap). In both cases a person pays the insurance premium because there is a risk that they may either become ill or face an unexpectedly large property tax increase in the future. Just as with health insurance, if enough homeowners face the risk of large property tax increases, the cost of the insurance may be justifi ed.
The other forms of tax limits, revenue limits and tax rate limits, might also work as insurance. These limits can cost a premium (in public services), but in return reduce the costs of sometimes randomly high tax burdens.
9 A limit on growth in property tax revenue can also provide an incentive to smooth property tax revenue over time.
Voters might also support tax rate and revenue limits if they are confused as to what causes increases in their property tax payments. If they view increases in property tax payments as a signal of increases in revenues and expenditures, voters may vote to limit increases in government revenues even though changes in the share of taxable value may be the primary cause of increases in tax payments.
Economists do not well understand the extent or the causes of changes in individual property tax payments as there has been little research on the topic. An important question for future research is measuring the magnitude of changes in individual property tax payments and attributing the proper portion of those changes in payments to changes in revenues and changes in the distribution of taxable value.
SUGGESTIVE EVIDENCE
An examination of individual property tax payments over time is beyond the scope of this paper. There does exist, however, some evidence suggesting that volatile individual tax payments are a concern for voters. First, real estate prices are often volatile and are very local.
10 Thus, real estate prices behave in a way that is conducive to the sometimes rapid changes in an individual's share of total taxable value. Second, the need of states to limit multiple features of property taxation suggests that constraint of local government revenues is not the only goal of property tax limitations.
Oregon provides an example of both of these. Oregon passed an expenditure limit in 1991 and subsequently experienced a decrease in per-capita property tax revenues and in property tax payments as a percentage of personal income (see Figure  1) . The revenue limit appears to be very effective and yet in 1997 voters passed Measure 50 limiting annual growth in all assessed values to three percent. A primary motivation for the new assessment limits was the general increase in the portion of the total tax base that is derived from residential property. By 1996, residential property made up a larger share of the total tax base than non-residential property for the fi rst time in at least 20 years (see Figure 2) . Thus, even though per-capita property tax collections were falling, many residential homeowners were likely experiencing increases in property tax payments. 10 Case and Mayer (1996) document the tremendous amount of within-market heterogeneity in price appreciation in a sample of communities in Massachusetts and also review similar empirical fi ndings for Los Angeles and Houston. Youngman and Malme (2005) discuss the implications of volatile real estate markets on property taxes. 
% of Income Revenue Year
Voters did not vote to simply limit growth in the total assessed value of residential property; they voted to limit increases in the assessed value of individual properties. The placement of limits on individual properties suggests that increases in residential taxable values were not uniform within the residential class and that within-residential price volatility also contributed to increases in individual tax payments.
At least fi ve other states besides Oregon have passed assessment limits on individual properties after revenue limits were already in effect.
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CONCLUSION
Limitations on property tax revenues, property tax rates, and property assessment are widespread in the United States. It is considered desirable that tax systems promote vertical and horizontal equity. Horizontal equity is satisfied when taxpayers owning property with identical market values pay the same in property taxes. Vertical equity is satisfi ed when individuals with higher valued property pay more in property taxes. Limits on tax revenues and rates do not directly affect either vertical or horizontal equity, but assessment limits can sacrifi ce both.
Assessments limits, however, are not the only policy that interferes with horizontal and vertical equity. Only 21 states have mandatory annual assessments and eight of these states have mandatory statewide assessment limitations. Property values can change monthly and certainly change on an annual basis. The non-annual assessment systems in 27 states are an implicit assessment cap of zero percent in non-assessment years. In the years between assessments, this zero percent cap will sacrifi ce horizontal 11 The fi ve states are AR, FL, MI, TX, WA. Washington's limits on increases in assessed value were twice ruled unconstitutional. and vertical equity in the same way that explicit systems like the three percent annual assessment cap in Florida sacrifi ce horizontal and vertical equity. Of the fi ve states with none of the three major limits on property taxes, only New Hampshire has a statewide annual assessment system. 12 It appears that every state in the continental United States, with the exception of New Hampshire, has a property tax system that explicitly limits volatility in individual tax payments through some form of assessment limits, non-annual assessment, revenue limits, or tax rate limits.
The maintenance of horizontal equity is often referred to as preserving the uniformity of the tax system. It is clear that uniformity is a desirable property of every tax system. Should uniformity always be maximized without regard for other aspects of the property tax system? A tradeoff exists between uniformity in property taxation and volatility in individual property tax payments. A strict preservation of uniformity, perhaps on an annual basis, is likely to produce more annual volatility in individual tax payments. If voters care about both volatility and uniformity, they are likely to sacrifi ce some uniformity in order to make their property tax payments more predictable and less volatile over time. This motivation for limits exists separately and distinctly from a motivation to constrain the tax and expenditure behavior of local governments.
